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An End to End-to-End? A Review
Essay of Barbara van Schewick’s
Internet Architecture and Innovation
Adam Candeub*
Barbara van Schewick’s Internet Architecture and Innovation surveys
broad areas of computer engineering and economic theory to argue that
some types of network neutrality regulation may be necessary to optimize
innovation. My central critique of her argument is its use of economic
theory to bolster one side of a highly politicized debate, rather than using
economic analysis to clarify that debate. Van Schewick relies on an
impressive array of economic approaches, but fails to acknowledge their
ambiguity. Her argument strings together a succession of questionable
economic generalizations, thereby greatly weakening her conclusions.
Van Schewick is not alone in using economics in this way. Too many
law professors rely on theoretical models but ignore their limiting
assumptions, failing to sort through the massive ambiguity inherent in their
application. A close examination of van Schewick’s argument, therefore,
leads to general recommendations for legal interdisciplinary research
methods.
On December 23, 2010, the FCC released its landmark “network
1
neutrality” Report and Order (“Order”). It prohibits a dominant Internet
service provider, such as Verizon or Comcast, from discriminating in favor

* Professor of Law, Director of Intellectual Property, Information, and
Communications Program, Michigan State University College of Law.
1. Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus. Practices, Report and Order, 25
F.C.C.R. 17905 (2010).
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of traffic or content that it owns or with which it is affiliated. For example,
the Order prohibits Comcast (or any other broadband provider) from
3
blocking or degrading competitor content, such as Netflix downloads.
Washington, D.C. policy pandemonium greeted the Order, releasing
the bile accumulated over the past decade of ideological debate over
Internet openness. A Washington Post headline blared, “FCC Approves
4
Net-Neutrality Rules; Criticism Is Immediate.” On the right, House
Energy and Commerce Committee Chair, Representative Fred Upton,
vowed to “use every resource available . . . to strike down the FCC’s
5
brazen effort to regulate the Internet.” Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
6
promised to slash funding to the FCC, and on the Wall Street Journal’s
opinion page, John Fund labeled the move “a coup” fomented by a cabal of
7
communications communists.
On the left, the reaction was also hostile, with the consensus that the
Order had little substance and failed to deliver a meaningful network
8
neutrality regulation. Given that President Obama’s campaign promised to
enact strong network protection, cries of betrayal echoed through the
9
Internet activist community.

2. Id. at paras. 62–69.
3. Id.
4. Cecilia Kang, FCC Approves Net-Neutrality Rules; Criticism Is Immediate, WASH.
POST (Dec. 22, 2010, 12:47 A.M.), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/12/21/AR2010122106110.html.
5. Chloe Albanesius, Republicans Vow to Take Down FCC’s Net Neutrality Rules,
PCMAG.COM (Dec. 22, 2010, 4:25 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2374661,00
.asp.
6. Cecilia King, Sen. Hutchison Moves to Block Funds for FCC on Net Neutrality
Rules, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2010, 5:56 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/
2010/12/senator_kay_bailey_hutchison_r.html.
7. John Fund, The Net Neutrality Coup, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703886904576031512110086694.html.
8. See, e.g., Press Release, FCC Net Neutrality Order Falls Short (Dec. 21, 2010),
available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/public-knowledge-fcc-net-neutrality-orderfalls-sh (“[T]he Commission could have established clear rules that would give more
protections to Internet users than the one approved today. Instead, these rules will be subject
to manipulation by telephone and cable companies.”); Press Release, Free Press, Free Press:
FCC Net Neutrality Order a ‘Squandered Opportunity’ (Dec. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.freepress.net/press-release/2010/12/21/free-press-fcc-net-neutrality-order%E2%80%98squandered-opport unity%E2%80%99 (“We are deeply disappointed that the
chairman chose to ignore the overwhelming public support for real Net Neutrality, instead
moving forward with industry-written rules that will for the first time in Internet history
allow discrimination online. This proceeding was a squandered opportunity to enact clear,
meaningful rules to safeguard the Internet’s level playing field and protect consumers.”).
9. See Dan Gillmor, The FCC’s Weak New “Open Internet” Rules, SALON.COM (Dec.
21, 2010, 2:45 PM), http://www.salon.com/2010/12/21/fcc_network_neutrality.
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The beating of breasts and gnashing of teeth seemed excessive, even
bizarre, given the esoteric regulation at issue. After all, as insiders and
telecommunication specialists know, the Order itself has big loopholes,
10
such as exempting wireless, rendering it close to toothless. More
significantly, it stands on weak jurisdictional grounds that the U.S. Court of
11
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is not likely to uphold. That the Order, likely
never to be law, should cause the policy “Chicken Littles” to see falling
skies suggests mass confusion or perhaps, more cynically, efforts to
influence the appellate outcome.
In this context, Stanford University professor Barbara van Schewick’s
12
book, Internet Architecture and Innovation, could not be more timely. It
defends Internet regulation, like that which the FCC recently promulgated,
as necessary to control Comcast’s, Verizon’s, and other broadband
13
providers’ anticompetitive tendencies and, above all, to ensure the
14
optimal amount of innovation. Van Schewick is a one-time colleague of
15
Larry Lessig, who popularized the “law as code” idea and is a long-time
advocate of the “end-to-end” Internet design principle discussed below.
Van Schewick’s prominent role in Internet debates—the FCC’s Order cites
and relies on her work in several instances—will make Internet
Architecture an important and influential contribution within Internet
policy debates.
In a nutshell, van Schewick argues that (1) the Internet’s “original”
16
so-called “broad” e2e architecture enables all applications; (2) real
options economic theory suggests that Internet architecture should enable
10. Nate Anderson, Wireless Gets a Free Pass on New Neutrality, ARS TECHNICA (Dec.
1, 2010), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/12/ throttle-away.ars.
11. The Order bases its authority on Title I of the Communications Act, which the D.C.
Circuit recently ruled as failing to give the FCC authority to regulate Comcast’s blocking of
peer-to-peer Internet traffic. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 652–54, 660–61
(D.C. Cir. 2010). Verizon has already appealed the Order. Amy Schatz, Verizon Appeals Net
Regulations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870
4747904576094354292080580.html.
12. BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION (2010).
13. See id. at 233.
14. Id. at 388 (“If the Internet’s value for society is to be preserved, policy makers will
have to intervene.”). Frustratingly, van Schewick does not answer the $64,000 question of
how they should intervene, but does tell us that “potential policy interventions will have to
be more sophisticated than simply requiring network providers to adhere to the broad
version of the end-to-end arguments . . . . [but] the broad version is at least a serious
contender to be one of the design principles for the future Internet.” Id. at 388–89.
15. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
16. Van Schewick distinguishes two versions of e2e: “the narrow version only applies
to some functions within a system, the broad version applies to the complete functionality of
a system.” VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 38.
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as many different innovators as possible; (3) “modular” Internet design
reduces coordination and transaction costs of innovation; (4) dominant
network operators have the incentive to discriminate against competing
applications providers even if they are more innovative; and (5)
evolutionary economic theory suggests more diverse innovators will
17
provide better innovation. Van Schewick then concludes that Internet
regulation—of the sort the FCC just mandated in its Order—is necessary to
18
protect Internet innovation.
Internet Architecture’s fatal weakness is that none of the areas of
economics on which van Schewick builds her argument lends itself to
simple conclusions. Disregarding ambiguity in the economic models on
which she relies, van Schewick strings together overbroad claims and
questionable conclusions to construct Internet Architecture. She uses
economic theories to support conclusions, but too often neglects to show in
a rigorous way why the assumptions that allow the models to produce her
results are more believable than opposing ones. Instead, she uses anecdotes
to demonstrate theory. While case studies and narrative may be highly
effective tools of persuasion, formal economic models are designed for
rigorous econometrics (i.e., properly sampled and controlled data). As the
old saw goes, the plural of anecdote is not data. When legal academics
claim the power of the social science game, they need to keep its rules.
Van Schewick shows that some economic models suggest that
Internet regulation may enhance innovation. But she does not attempt to
address her myriad models’ ambiguities or examine data rigorously to
conclude whether this result is at all likely. Given that Internet Architecture
uses economic analysis to justify the specific public prescription of
regulating the Internet, this shortcoming is not minor. To paraphrase David
19
Hume, “maybe” does not imply “ought.”
Professor van Schewick is not alone. Internet Architecture sadly
enters a long syllabus errorum of interdisciplinary legal
20
telecommunications scholarship. Thus, a close examination of van

17. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 299.
18. Id. at 373–75.
19. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 320 (Batoche Books, 1999)
(1739) (“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always
remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and
establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a
sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is
not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.”)
(emphasis added).
20. See infra note 68 for a discussion of the work of professor Christopher Yoo.
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Schewick’s argument leads to recommendations applicable to legal
interdisciplinary research method generally.
Building on Lessig’s work, van Schewick’s work first distinguishes
between what she calls the “broad” and “narrow” versions of the e2e
21
network design principle. For nondevotees of Internet wonkery, e2e
network design requires that “intelligence” (i.e., application functions)
22
should be located at its “ends” (i.e., the users). The protocols that
23
exchange information between users do not do much except transport.
This allows individuals to build-on new applications that can still network
and communicate.
To get a sense of what this means, compare e2e network design to its
predecessor, the Bell Public Switched Telephone Network (“Bell PSTN”)
(i.e., how we all communicated before 1995 or so). With e2e, the network
smarts are widely distributed and modular. Taking advantage of the
Internet’s common transport function, users can independently add
applications and functions. In the Bell PSTN, by contrast, all the
intelligence resided at the switch (i.e., the central place in the network that
24
the telephone company controls).
End-users could not add functions;
instead, the phone company provided all services (such as voice
communications, voicemail, call waiting, speed dialing, and 800 services)
25
centrally.
Notice the tradeoff between e2e and centralized, integrated designs
such as the phone network or cable system. Some network functions
require greater coordination and centralization than e2e can provide. For
instance, the Internet can neither provide the old telephone network’s level
of security or quality of service, nor match cable systems’ video delivery
26
capacity. But the telephone system limits potential uses that e2e permits.
Different networks perform some functions better than others.
21.
22.
23.
24.

VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 41.
Id. at 88–91.
Id. at 56.
JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN
TELECOM POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 170 (2005).
25. Id.
26. Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 933 (2001) (“The
Internet's design principles are different from the design principles that governed the
telephone . . . the telephone network was not governed by the Internet's principle of e2e. It
was instead governed by a different end-to-end philosophy--that the telephone company
controlled the network from end to end. This meant that AT&T would not be neutral about
the uses to which the telephone system could be put. For much of the history of the
telephone network, it was forbidden to use the network in ways not specified by AT&T. It
was a unlawful, for example, to attach devices that performed services not offered by AT&T
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Larry Lessig and Mark Lemley famously argued that e2e plays a
27
necessary role in Internet innovating. Their argument has great appeal.
Indeed, the Internet allows program developers to build the applications
that define contemporary life—from email and Facebook to Google and
YouTube. Innovators can distribute their creations without approval from
(or coordination with) providers like Verizon or Comcast. Rather, the
Internet protocol “dumbly” provides transport to the ends doing the
application-specific computation. Lessig and Lemley argued that we should
protect this vitality from Comcast’s or Verizon’s anticompetitive desire to
control matters centrally—transforming the Internet into cable television or
28
the old telephone system. This general policy prescription was known as
“network neutrality” and it was what December’s controversial FCC Order
mandated (in an addlepated form).
Building on Lessig and Lemley, van Schewick identifies two different
versions of the e2e argument: the narrow and the broad. The narrow
version has a presumption that a “function should not be implemented in a
lower layer, if it cannot be completely and correctly implemented at that
29
layer.” In other words, the smarts (the error detection and other protocols
necessary to run real live applications) should be at the edges when such
placement would not impair an application’s performance. In contrast, the
broad version states that “a function or service should be carried out within
a network layer [i.e., available to all clients of the network] only if it is
30
needed by all clients of that layer.” Put another way, under van
Schewick’s broad analysis, if a function is needed by all applications, it
must be at a lower level to be available to all.
Van Schewick then argues for her broad e2e architecture as the
regulation’s guiding principle. Even before reaching analysis of van
Schewick’s use of economics, this claim is fraught. First, it is not clear that
any network designer ever adopted the broad e2e architecture. As the
quotation from Lessig and Lemley suggests, it was never a formalized rule,
but rather an idea that emerged after years of network design, and arguably

or to provide services that competed with the services provided by AT&T.”).
27. Id. at 930 (“The e2e argument organizes the placement of functions within a
network. It counsels that the “intelligence” in a network should be located at the top of a
layered system—at its “ends,” where users put information and applications onto the
network.”).
28. Id. at 936–38.
29. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 60 (quoting LARRY L. PETERSON & BRUCE S.
DAVIE, COMPUTER NETWORKS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 387 (4th ed. 2007)).
30. Id. at 67 (internal quotations omitted).
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was never implemented anywhere. Lacking descriptive weight, the claim
must be entirely prescriptive.
Second, and much more critically, van Schewick’s definition contains
circularity and could, in fact, chill innovation. This is a key question, given
van Schewick’s central goal of protecting innovation. Because the broad
version of e2e would require every existing application to have access to
Internet transport functionality, it could entrench existing applications and
chill the development of applications requiring some specialization at the
network level. Further, van Schewick could mean that networks should
support any potential network application. If this is her meaning, she in
effect converts the Internet design into a tremendous subsidy (and
innovation disincentive) from network builders to application designers.
Near the end of Internet Architecture, van Schewick recognizes this
subsidy, which she sees as a tradeoff between “long-term evolvability” of
32
new applications
and what she terms “short-term performance
33
optimizations.” She argues that we should prefer long-term evolvability,
because “there are many more applications that have yet to be invented,
which makes the long-term evolvability of the network more important
34
than short-term performance optimizations.”
It is not clear, however, that the potential of future applications
justifies any particular architecture. Maybe important new innovations
require short-term performance optimization. There are things, such as
guaranteeing quality of service or providing better security and streaming
video, that current Internet design does not do as well as the telephone
networks or cable systems. After all, many innovations that people like,
such as the Kindle or the iPad, appear to violate the broad version of
network neutrality because they do require specialized network and
transport functions, rendering their functionality resistant to modular
innovation that the broad e2e protects. If van Schewick cannot say why
long-term innovation is better than other types, her regulatory prescription
based on her preference for long-term evolvability loses its power.
After defining broad e2e, van Schewick turns to economics to show
that this broad version leads to greater innovation. First, she asks whether
35
there is an optimal level of innovation. For this, she looks to real options
theory, a branch of economics that borrows from finance and portfolio
theory by viewing actual investments as bets (not unlike options) on future
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 389.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 115–22.
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value. She envisions the Internet as a portfolio of investments—of real
37
options. In a novel and interesting move, she then asks what type of
38
network architecture would maximize value.
Not surprisingly, van Schewick concludes that the broad e2e allows
39
for greater diversity of investments, which portfolio theory would prefer.
She argues that broad e2e lowers the cost of innovation because it increases
40
modularity, the ability of parts of the Internet to develop independently.
Modularity “enables innovation . . . . [that] do[es] not affect the rest of the
system,” allowing for adoption of innovations that do not require systemic
41
network change. And thus, investments in modular networks have lower
costs. Further, the rate of change in modular networks will increase with
uncertainty because “modular architecture enables innovators to capture the
potentially large benefits associated with risky projects and avoid the
42
downsides.”
Van Schewick’s reliance on real options theory is misplaced. She is
no doubt correct that broad e2e encourages more investment (and
presumably innovation), but only innovation of a certain type—little
innovations that do not require greater changes in the network. In other
words, broad e2e encourages only those innovations that do not need
specialization at the transport layer or other layers. Conversely, modular
architecture makes innovations requiring a high level of coordination, such
as those involving security or quality of service, more expensive. But, just
as no one knows if long-term evolvability is better than short-term
optimization, no one knows whether little innovations requiring little
change in the network are more valuable from an investment perspective
than big innovations that affect the entire Internet.
Van Schewick next looks to transaction cost economics to defend the
broad version of Internet architecture. Led by Oliver Williamson and
others, this branch of economics looks to the costs of information between
43
employees and contracting parties. It asks why some transactions are
performed within a firm and others by arm’s length market dealings
36. Id. at 124.
37. Id. at 125.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 125–26.
41. Id. at 125 (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 127; see also id. at 145 (“According to real-options analysis, hidden modules
with low core costs of innovation may justify a large number of parallel approaches aimed
at improving the module . . . .”).
43. See Oliver Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
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between firms. There are costs and efficiencies associated with both types
44
of transactions. Intrafirm dealings permit lower monitoring costs. They
function well in endeavors with high coordination costs, but create agency
problems (i.e., employees will do what employers want but may take
advantage of them in other ways). Arm’s length transactions can eliminate
agency costs and work well in endeavors with low coordination costs, but
they present higher monitoring costs (i.e., firms typically do not have
closely coordinated operations with independent contractors, but do have to
45
make sure that they are not being sold a bill of goods).
Van Schewick argues that modular architecture creates a “cost
structure [that] lets a wide range of innovators with diverse motivations and
46
funding models develop new applications.” Further, she asserts that “the
architecture of the Internet” makes “arm’s-length relationships and vertical
47
integration among providers of different components [] equally feasible.”
Here, she seems to say that modular architecture offers a sort of
Williamsonian free lunch. Modularity allows for more actors to innovate
and produce applications more cheaply, without raising coordination costs
above those that an integrated firm faces.
This claim is quite expansive and potentially quite important. Perhaps
it is true, perhaps it is not. However, the economic models van Schewick
48
cites do not demonstrate this importance. Van Schewick does not provide
any formal modeling, but instead she supports her claim with many
49
anecdotes. No one can doubt there has been tremendous innovation under
modular Internet design pursuant to arm’s length transactions. But, again, it
has been innovation of a certain type—that which requires minimal
coordination. People may want innovations that require greater network
integration.
Van Schewick then confronts the central question of Internet
regulation: assuming that the broad e2e architecture provides more
innovation, do broadband providers, like Comcast or Verizon, have the
50
economic incentive to support the broad e2e design? And, if they do not,
44. See generally id. at 238–45.
45. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
46. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 205.
47. Id. at 202.
48. She cites to a dizzying array of economists. Her principal citations to modularity
and innovation, CARLISS YOUNG BALDWIN AND KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER
OF MODULARITY VOL. 1, (2000), do not make such sweeping arguments. While Baldwin and
Clarke do examine conditions in which modularity is optimal, application of their ideas to
current Internet markets is not clear.
49. See generally VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 297–353.
50. Id. at 337.
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van Schewick asks whether government should mandate network
regulation, as in the FCC’s recently released Order, to counter these
51
anticompetitive tendencies. Van Schewick says that foreclosure is likely
52
and regulation necessary.
The question of whether Comcast or Verizon will allow a thousand
innovative applications to bloom—or whether they will block
competitors—is the economic question of network regulation and a
perennial question in economic theory.
The laissez faire opponents of Internet regulation point to the “single
53
monopoly” rent theorem to argue against Internet regulation. They argue
that because Comcast is already receiving monopoly rents for providing
broadband, it can maximize profits by providing the most valuable and
54
diverse offerings. Building on this argument, economists argue that the
monopolists can internalize complementary efficiencies and thereby
55
provide content more efficiently than the nonmonopolists.
Economic models for foreclosure are various, complex, and, given
that economists write them, ambiguous in their application. Further, as
some legal scholars point out, focusing on market power only in the last
56
mile mischaracterizes the Internet market. The Internet is more than
Comcast’s and Verizon’s control of the last mile. The Internet includes the
host of backbone providers that constitute the network (the “Internet
51. Id. at 345–47.
52. Id.
53. Davina Sashkin, Failure Of Imagination: Why Inaction On Net Neutrality
Regulation Will Result In A De Facto Legal Regime Promoting Discrimination And
Consumer Harm, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 261, 297 (2006) (“For example, a company
selling monopolized broadband Internet service bundled with a portal service could, per the
‘one monopoly rent’ theory, only collect one monopoly price for the bundled service;
because the company controls the underlying facility and can therefore charge the monopoly
price for access to it, monopolizing the complementary portal market would not offer
additional profit.”).
54. Id.
55. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 103 (2003) (“ICE [the internalizing complementary efficiency
theory] maintains that the platform monopolist cannot increase its overall profit by
monopolizing the applications market, because it could always have charged consumers a
higher platform price in the first place; it has no incentive to take profits or inefficiently
hamper or exclude rivals in the applications market because it can appropriate the benefits
of cheap and attractive applications in its pricing of the platform. To the contrary, ICE
claims that a platform monopolist has an incentive to innovate and push for improvements
in its system — including better applications — in order to profit from a more valuable
platform.”).
56. See Adam Candeub & Daniel J. McCartney, Law and the Open Internet, 64 FED.
COMM. L.J. 493 (2012).
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57

cloud”). By ignoring market dynamics deep within the Internet cloud, van
Schewick relies exclusively on vertical foreclosure models that arguably
58
have little relationship to reality.
Van Schewick recognizes this ambiguity. Nonetheless, she states that
59
“some general observations are possible,” including that the monopolist
broadband provider will use discriminatory pricing to increase its profits to
60
“disadvantag[e] certain classes of applications” and that this “reduce[s]
the profits of independent developers of complementary products, thus
61
reducing their incentives to innovate.” Van Schewick recognizes, but
62
minimizes, the inherent theoretical ambiguity that weakens her argument.
This whole section jars the reader. Van Schewick describes, in great
63
detail, exceptions to the single monopoly rent theorem. But she follows,
with little argument, as to whether these exceptions in fact apply to the
Internet. Such argument would require teasing apart the multitude of
foreclosure models, identifying their assumptions, and using the best
empirical data to see which sets of assumptions best fit the data. The
seriousness of van Schewick’s work, and her own scholarly ambitions,
require her to take these additional steps.
Finally, van Schewick argues that decentralized architectures create
64
more innovation, looking to evolutionary economics to make her point.
Evolutionary economics models innovation like natural evolution. It breaks
from traditional economics in that it assumes that actors work under
65
Knightean uncertainty. Economics generally holds that actors can
estimate risk; Knightean uncertainty holds that risk is not susceptible to
66
estimation. In other words, Knightean uncertainty holds that actors know
future events are uncertain, but cannot attach a number to their probability
of occurrence. As in blind evolution, evolutionary economics predicts that
57. Rob Frieden, Internet 3.0: Identifying Problems and Solutions to the Network
Neutrality Debate, 1 INT'L J. COMM. 461, 474 & n.47 (2007) (“The Internet cloud refers to
the vast array of interconnected networks that make up the Internet and provider users with
seamless connectivity to these networks and the content available via these networks.”).
58. Id.
59. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 277.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 281.
62. Id. at 471 n.238.
63. See id. at 230–62.
64. See id. at 280–82.
65. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 289 (2010) (“Knight . .
. distinguished . . . between calculable risk—risk to which a numerical probability can be
assigned . . . —and uncertainty, to which a numerical probability and distribution cannot be
assigned with any confidence that it is correct.”).
66. Id.
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better results come from diverse populations. Van Schewick claims “[n]ot
only will a large, diverse group of potential innovators discover a larger
number of opportunities for innovation than a small group of homogenous
network providers; they will also realize a larger number of the
67
opportunities that were discovered.” Thus, van Schewick concludes
regulation must ensure network neutrality to ensure a diversity of
innovation.
Van Schewick is probably correct that evolutionary economics shows
in general that greater diversity leads to greater innovation. But
evolutionary economics in no way points to the optimal level of innovation.
Investment costs money. There is a tradeoff between this cost and the
payoff from innovation investment, including opportunity costs. Van
Schewick fails to acknowledge that at some point there is a diminishing
return to investing in diversity. She therefore cannot say when the benefit
of preserving broad e2e exceeds its costs.
Further, van Schewick’s reliance on evolutionary economics and its
Knightean uncertainty to determine the value of Internet investment leads
to another contradiction. She previously relied on real options theory,
which explicitly assumes that risk for Internet applications can be
estimated. Either uncertainty in Internet application development resists
estimation, or it does not. Switching bedrock theoretical assumptions
undermines the power of both analyses.
Van Schewick has shown that it is plausible that her broad e2e
promotes innovation. The weakness of her economic analyses, for
economists, is that she pays too little attention to the likelihood of her
claim’s correctness. Under certain conditions, her economic conclusions
may be correct. But, van Schewick does not investigate in a rigorous way
what those conditions are or how likely they are. Indeed, even if we posit a
two-thirds chance that she is correct about each step in her argument, the
odds that she would be correct on all steps would be quite low.
This critique of van Schewick’s work is applicable to a distressing
amount of law and economics research, perhaps because of foundational
differences in methodology. When an economist develops a model, the
model formalizes an intuition, showing the precise parameters and
assumptions for which it is valid. Surprising theoretical results expand our
understanding of the logically and mathematically possible mechanisms
working in the world.
Legal academics, however, must go beyond the merely possible and
show the advisability of a given rule. This requires insight into likelihood.
67. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 301.
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In its selective use of economic theory, Internet Architecture is sadly not
alone. Rather, it reflects a disturbing, perhaps endemic trend in
communications legal scholarship—on both the right and left—to latch on
to some model, treat it as truth, and avoid critically engaging its limitations
68
and assumptions.

68. Christopher Yoo, fierce opponent of network neutrality regulation and van
Schewick’s ideological enantiomer, often does the same thing. To take one particularly
glaring example, Yoo’s articles on Fifth Amendment regulatory takings all depend upon
what is known as the efficient component pricing rule (“ECPR”). See, e.g., Daniel F.
Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and Constitutional
Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 993–96 (2003) [hereinafter Spulber & Yoo, Access
to Networks]. This theory holds that when a regulator mandates interconnection between a
competitor and incumbent network (i.e., a formerly regulated monopolist such as AT&T),
the price the competitor pays must include “lost profits” that the monopolist was not
permitted to make during its regulated existence. Id. Or, as Yoo puts it:
The proper cost valuation of making an input available is the direct cost of
the input plus the reduction in the value of the output. Thus, prices set at
economic cost of an input must represent the sum of the direct incremental cost
of providing the input and the opportunity costs associated with providing the
input to a competitor.
Id. at 906; see also Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Toward a Unified Theory of
Access to Local Telephone Networks, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 95–96 (2008) (advocating
EPCR); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as
Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1687, 1713 n 53 (2005)
(advocating EPCR). Spulber and Yoo go so far as to argue that the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause mandates use of EPCR by regulators. Spulber & Yoo, Access to Networks,
supra, at 1023–24. Incumbent telephone companies, of course, adore this theory because it
requires new entrants to pay very high interconnection rates, but the Supreme Court
explicitly rejected the ECPR. See Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 514 (2002).
Leading scholars have also thoroughly debunked the ECPR as a rule that the Constitution
mandates. See Jim Chen, The Death of the Regulatory Compact: Adjusting Prices and
Expectations in the Law of Regulated Industries, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1265, 1313 (2006) (“The
futile effort to constitutionalize any ratemaking rule, let alone a backward-looking
methodology that repudiates decades of regulatory wisdom, runs into the teeth of Supreme
Court doctrine.”). But for the purposes of this Review, what is significant is that
economists’ opinions are, to say the least, highly mixed about ECPR’s theoretical validity.
In the words of Nicholas Economides, an international leader in the field of network
economics at the New York University,
“In economics, typically ‘efficient’ is meant to be ‘socially efficient,’ that is,
maximizing total social welfare or total surplus. Does the ECPR or the MECPR, in general, maximize social surplus? Absolutely not! Although the rule
has been debated for the last 18 years, neither its creators nor its present
supporters have ever provided a proof that the use of either of these two rules
maximizes social surplus . . . .”
Nicholas Economides, The Tragic Inefficiency of the M-ECPR, in DOWN TO THE WIRE:
STUDIES IN THE DIFFUSION AND REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 142,
144 (Allan L. Shampine ed., 2003). Yet, one searches in vain in Yoo’s writings for an
acknowledgement of the limits of the theory he espouses with such vigor. Despite their
ideological differences, both he and van Schewick base their legal scholarship on blinkered
economic predicates.
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Well, so what? Lawyers and judges selectively use expert economic
opinions and their models, so why not legal academics? Yet legal
academics have a duty to get at the right answer, not simply advocate a
model. This requires recognizing a model’s limitations, assumptions, and,
above all, likely applicability to the real world. Failure to adhere to this
principle diminishes legal scholarship. When legal scholars forcefully
assert that some other field has clear and valuable insights for the law, as
69
van Schewick does, they are usually addressing a scholarly audience
without background in that other field. Without explicitly teasing out the
limits of their theories, such scholarship incompletely engages the
readership, potentially reducing scholarly debate to slogans or ideological
predilection now resting on the mystique and irrefutability of another
discipline.
This returns us to where this review started—the absurdly partisan
debate surrounding network neutrality. Legal scholarship could bring some
lux to the aetas through critical examination of economic models of
Internet behavior and empirical data, in order to analyze their implications
for regulation. Shoehorning the Internet into economic models that serve
one particular ideological view hardly achieves that goal. Legal scholarship
must do better.

69. VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 12, at 2 (“After decades of research on innovation, we
understand how changes in law, in norms, or in prices affect the economic environment for
innovation and how they affect innovators’ decisions to innovate.”).

